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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) confers jurisdiction on this Court to review the
Court of Appeals' Memorandum Decision in Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App
249, 190 P.3d 13, rendered on June 26, 2008.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
By order dated January 22, 2009, this Court granted petitioner's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari as to the following issues:
ISSUE NO. 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district
court's award of retroactive alimony.
ISSUE NO. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining to address
Petitioner's argument regarding her claim for a share of rental income.
By order dated January 22, 2009, this Court granted respondent's Cross-Petition
for Writ of Certiorari as to the following issue:
ISSUE NO. 3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in assuming the
regularity of the proceedings as to Cross-Petitioner's challenge to the
district court's denial of retroactive child-support.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9): "Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if
the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-105(1): "Every child is presumed to be in need of the support
of the child's mother and father. Every mother and father shall support their children."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-202(4): "When no prior court order exists, the court shall
determine and assess all arrearages based upon the guidelines described in this chapter."

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case is on writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. It is a divorce case
that was appealed and cross-appealed, resulting in the issuance on June 26, 2008 of
Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, 190 P.3d 13. (Resp. Add. Tab 1.) The
Memorandum Decision reversed the trial court's award of alimony to petitioner Shirlene
Ostermiller ("Wife") for the time period subsequent to the parties' bifurcated divorce and
prior to Wife's remarriage, upheld the trial court's finding that Wife should not receive
alimony or rental income for the time period prior to the parties' bifurcated divorce, and
upheld the trial court's order extinguishing child support for the nearly four-year time
period during which the parties' children were in the sole physical custody of respondent
David G. Ostermiller ("Husband").
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
This action for divorce commenced January 14, 2000, with the filing by Wife of
her Verified Divorce Petition. (R. at 3.) Temporary custody of the parties' children was
awarded to Husband at a hearing before the domestic relations commissioner on February
3, 2000. (R. at 36-37, Resp. Add. Tab 4.)
Thereafter, the parties entered into a written Stipulation and Property Settlement
Agreement thai resolved the parties' property issues. (R. at 73.) On March 26, 2001, the
court entered an initial decree of divorce incorporating the stipulation ("the Bifurcated
Decree"). (R. at 83.)
On October 2, 2003, Wife remarried. (R. at 337.)
2

On December 17, 2003, the parties entered into an oral stipulation on the issues of
permanent custody, parent-time, and prospective child support. (R. at 193, Pet. Add. Tab
5.) This stipulation was reduced to order on April 27, 2005. (R. at 488, Pet. Add. Tab 7.)
Husband's claim to retroactive child support was not addressed in the stipulation or the
order. The issues of alimony and attorney fees were reserved.
On June 17, 2004, Wife filed a Request for Trial "for the purpose of settling the
alimony issues in this case." (R. at 278.)
On February 10, 2005, Husband filed a motion for summary dismissal of Wife's
retroactive alimony claim. The trial court denied the motion by memorandum decision
dated April 27, 2005. (R. at 485, Pet. Add. Tab 6.)
The issues of child support arrearages, retroactive alimony, and attorney fees were
tried to the court on August 31, 2005, September 20, 2005, and November 16, 2006. The
court issued its first memorandum decision following trial on March 5, 2007. (R. at
1084, Pet. Add. Tab 12.) Wife moved for reconsideration (R. at 1093), and the court
issued its second memorandum decision following trial on April 27, 2007. (R. at 1133,
Resp. Add. Tab 2.) Husband filed a motion to alter or amend the second memorandum
decision (R. at 1137), and while that motion was pending, the court entered a Final
Decree (R. at 1173). Husband filed a motion to alter, amend, or set aside the Final
Decree (R. at 1193), and the court issued its third memorandum decision on June 6, 2007
(R. at 1224). Thereafter, the court entered its Amended Final Decree. (R at 1227, Pet.
Add. Tab 13.)
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The Amended Final Decree awarded Wife retroactive alimony for the time period
after entry of the Bifurcated Decree and prior to her remarriage, did not award Wife
retroactive alimony or rental income for the time period prior to entry of the Bifurcated
Decree, and did not assess child support arrearages for the time period prior to the
December 17, 2003 stipulation during which Husband had sole physical custody of the
parties' children. (R. at 1228, Pet. Add. Tab 13.)
Husband appealed to the Court of Appeals and Wife cross-appealed. On June 26,
2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Memorandum Decision in Ostermiller v.
Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249. The Court of Appeals denied Wife's petition for
rehearing, and on September 15, 2008, Wife filed her Petition for Writ Certiorari. On
October 14, 2008, Husband filed his Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. By order dated
January 22, 2009, this Court granted Wife's petition on two of the issues briefed, namely,
retroactive alimony and rental income, and granted Husband's cross-petition on the issue
of child support arrearages.
Statement of Facts
The parties were married August 1, 1992, in Logan, Utah. (R. at 3.) They are the
parents of twin boys, Colton John Ostermiller and Caden Dennis Ostermiller, born
August 14, 1996. (R. at 3.)
The parties' marriage was tumultuous and Wife became increasingly unstable in
the months prior to filing for divorce. (R. at 35.) Husband's contention at trial was that
Wife began an extra-marital affair with Dana Shaw in the spring of 1999, which
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culminated in Wife initiating this divorce action in January 2000. (R. at 624-25; R. at
730.) Wife married Mr. Shaw October 2, 2003. (R. at 730; R. at 485; R. at 1085.)
Simultaneous with her Verified Divorce Petition, Wife filed a motion for
temporary relief requesting that she be awarded temporary custody of the children,
temporary child support and temporary alimony. (R. at 10.) Husband filed a countermotion for temporary relief requesting, inter alia, temporary custody of the children and
temporary child support. (R. at 19.)
The request for temporary relief was heard before the domestic relations
commissioner on February 3, 2000, at which time the commissioner awarded Husband
, sole physical custody of the children. Wife received "visitation [from] Sunday morning
to Tuesdays at 6 p.m." The attorneys were to "make a recommendation to the court
regarding child support." Husband was ordered to pay Wife $1,000 to allow her to
secure an apartment. (R. at 36-37, Resp. Add. Tab 4.)
The parties resolved all property issues the following year by written stipulation,
incorporated into the Bifurcated Decree, and the marriage was dissolved. Wife was
awarded one of the parties' rental properties ("[the] Apple Tree Lane Apartments," R.
at 84), and Husband was awarded the other rental property ("[t]wo 4-plex buildings
known as Carriage Court," R. at 85). The Bifurcated Decree also altered Wife's parenttime schedule slightly, providing:

"[T]he temporary custody order shall remain the

same except that beginning Sunday, March 18, 2001, [Wife] shall pick up the children at
3:00 p.m. and then on the following Sunday, March 25, at 10:00 a.m. and [Wife] shall
alternate those times each Sunday until further order of the Court. Wife shall also have
5

the children every Thursday from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m." (R. at 86, ^ 6, Pet. Add. Tab
2.) Wife continued to have two overnights per week, or 28% of the time for purposes of
child support calculations. This schedule remained in place until December 17, 2003.
The Bifurcated Decree reserved the issues of "child support, childcare, the income
tax exemptions, alimony, if any, custody and visitation" for later resolution. (R. at 84,
Pet. Add. Tab 2.)
In September 2002, Wife hired new counsel to represent her. (R. at 132.) Shortly
thereafter, on October 16, 2002, Wife filed a motion for order to show cause. (R. at 138.)
The motion requested "temporary custody of the parties [sic] minor children" and "child
support for the minor children." (R. at 139.) Wife made no request for temporary
alimony at that time, nor at any time thereafter.
On October 2, 2003, Wife remarried. (R. at 337.)
On December 17, 2003, the parties appeared in court for a bench trial that was
scheduled to take place that day. The parties gave their opening statements, at which
point court recessed with counsel in chambers, off the record. (R. at 193, Pet. Add.
Tab 5.) Subsequently, the matter went back on the record, and the parties entered into an
oral stipulation that resolved the issues of permanent custody, parent-time and
prospective child support. (R. at 193-94, Pet. Add. Tab 5.) The parties stipulated to joint
custody, with Wife's parent-time with the children to increase to "every other week from
Thursday night to Tuesday morning," holidays pursuant to the statutory schedule, and
five weeks during the summer. Under the new joint custody arrangement there was to be
"no base child support award." (R. at 193-94, Pet. Add. Tab 5.)
6

This stipulation was later reduced to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, entered April 27, 2005, which provides: "[NJeither party will pay to the other
child support under this parenting arrangement and [ ] each will pay 50% of all uninsured
medical expenses." (R. at 490, Pet. Add. Tab 7.)
The issue of child support arrearages for the time period that the children were in
Husband's sole custody was not addressed in the stipulation or the order.
On June 17, 2004, some six months after the December 17, 2003 stipulation and
nine months after Wife had remarried, Wife filed a "Request for Trial" for the purpose of
"settling the alimony issues in this case." (R. at 278.) At no time prior to her remarriage
did Wife request an award of temporary alimony over and above the $1,000 awarded to
her at the February 2000 hearing, nor was an order of temporary alimony ever entered.
At no time prior to the June 17, 2004 Request for Trial did Wife request that the issue of
alimony be tried separately from the other issues in the case.
A trial date was set for December 9, 2004 pursuant to Wife's request. (R. at 308.)
Husband's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel on December 6, 2004 (R. at
311). Husband simultaneously requested that trial be continued to allow him to obtain
new counsel, in particular, "a family law specialist." (R. at 314.) The motion was
granted, and new counsel appeared. (R. at 325.) Immediately thereafter, and in
accordance with the scheduling order established at the court's January 5, 2005 Status
Conference (R. at 327), Husband filed a motion to dismiss Wife's alimony claim. (R. at
334.) At the hearing on that motion, the matter was taken under advisement, and
pursuant to Wife's request, the trial previously scheduled for May 18, 2005 (R. 332) was
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continued to August 31, 2005. (R. at 466-67.) The court subsequently issued a
memorandum decision denying Husband's motion to dismiss the alimony claim. (R. at
485, Pet. Add. Tab 6.)
Wife and Husband submitted trial briefs to the court on August 29, 2005.
Husband's trial brief identified as a trial issue the amount of child support arrearages
owed by Wife for the time period from February 2000, when Husband was awarded sole
physical custody of the parties' two children, until December 2003, when the parties
entered into the December 17, 2003 stipulation. (R. at 621.) That issue, the retroactive
alimony issue, and the parties' attorney fees claims were tried to the court on August 31,
2005, September 20, 2005, and November 16, 2006.
After trial, the Court issued its first Memorandum Decision. (R. at 1084, Pet. Add.
Tab 12.) As to the relevant time period for an award of alimony to Wife and child
support to Husband, the court found "that the question of alimony must be addressed
between the period of February 2000 to April 2001, and April 2001 to October 2003, and
child support between February 2000 and December 2003, taking into consideration the
March 26, 2001 Order." (R. at 1086, Pet. Add. Tab 12.) The court found, for purposes of
both alimony and child support, that Wife's wage income was $1,298 per month, and that
after entry of the Bifurcated Decree she had additional rental income of $970 per month,
for total income of $2,268 per month. The court found Husband's combined wage and
rental income to be $4,416 per month. (R. at 1090, Pet. Add. Tab 12.)
On the issue of child support, the court found: "Plaintiffs parent-time consisted of
28% of the time for purposes of establishing child support, and that provision remained
8

intact until the 17 of December, 2003, when a modification occurred providing for the
Petitioner to have an increase in parent-time to 40%. No child support thereafter was to
be paid by either party." (R. at 1085, Pet. Add. Tab 12.) The court concluded: "There
has been no evidence suggested to the Court to establish a deviation from the uniform
child support level, therefore, the incomes found by the Court herein are to be used by the
parties in establishing child support to be paid from the Petitioner to the Respondent
during the period above-mentioned." (R. at 1090, Pet. Add. Tab 12.)
On the issue of alimony, the trial court found "that the initial period of February
2000 to April 2001 no alimony is awarded, due to the fact that Respondent provided for
virtually [all] the family's expenses and it is impossible to calculate the parties' needs at
that time." (R. at 1090.) However, the trial court did award alimony to Wife for the
period following the Bifurcated Decree, "from April 1, 2001 to October 1, 2003, when
Petitioner married." (R. at 1228, U 1, Pet. Add. Tab 13.) The trial court used "the
equalization approach" to conclude that Husband owed Wife "alimony of $1,074.00 per
month, for a total of 30 months or $32,220.00." (R. at 1228, f 1.)
Wife objected to several of the trial court's rulings in a motion for reconsideration,
arguing inter alia that the trial court should have awarded her alimony for the time period
preceding the Bifurcated Decree, or alternatively, should have awarded her one-half the
rental income received by Husband. (R. at 1093-94.) Wife also argued that child support
should be calculated on a joint custody worksheet. (R. at 1095.) Husband responded,
arguing that Wife's motion should be denied as it failed to comport with the rules of civil
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procedure, having identified no grounds for the court to amend its ruling and raising new
points that were without foundation. (R. at 1115-17.)
Wife's reply memorandum addressed only the issue of the court's denial of an
award of alimony from the period between February 2000 and April 2001, identifying
grounds for the court to amend its ruling as to that issue. (R. at 1120.) Husband filed a
sur-reply addressing that issue as to the grounds that had been identified. (R. at 1124.)
In a second post-trial Memorandum Decision dated April 27, 2007, the trial court
addressed Wife's objection on the alimony issue, stating: "[Wife's] first point is that she
should be awarded alimony for the period of January 2000 through April 2001 on the
basis that the apartment income of the parties was received and used entirely at the
discretion of [Husband]. The Court did not ignore that fact in issuing its decision but
found, as stated in [Husband's] sur-reply, that the income from those apartments was
used to provide for family expenses and that virtually all of the family expenses were
assumed by [Husband]. The exact figures were not supplied, but the lifestyle of the
parties continued during that period of time much in the fashion it had before, in that the
monthly bills and expenses were paid for and that they were, by testimony, paid for in
part from the proceeds of those apartments." (R. at 1133, Resp. Add. Tab 2.) Based on
these findings, the trial court denied Wife's motion for reconsideration on this point, and
did not award alimony or rental income to Wife for the time period prior to entry of the
Bifurcated Decree. (R. at 1228, Pet. Add. Tab 13.)
On the issue of child support, the court ruled: "There was no responsive argument
by the Respondent to that provision under paragraph 4 of the Petitioner's memorandum.
10

Therefore, that relief is granted and child support should be awarded accordingly." (R. at
1134,Resp.Add. Tab 2.)
Husband immediately filed a motion to amend the second post-trial Memorandum
Decision with respect to the court's child support ruling. Husband argued that the
question of the appropriate child support worksheet to use was governed by statute, and
that the sole custody worksheet must be used here, where Wife had the children less than
30% of the overnights. Wife's argument to the contrary did not comport with the trial
court's findings, the record, or the law, and the trial court did not have discretion to adopt
it(R. at 1139-56.)
While Husband's motion was pending, Wife submitted a Final Decree which
awarded no child support for the time period that the children were in Husband's sole
custody, stating: "For child support purposes, the Court uses the same analysis as
discussed in the trial on December 17, 2003, and Findings dated April 27, 2005, and
using a Joint Custody worksheet with Petitioner and Respondent both co-parenting the
children at least fifty percent (50%) of the time, the Court finds that the child support
between April 1, 2001 and October 1, 2003, should be zero. Although the Petitioner was
even willing to use forty percent (40%), the previous trial used fifty percent (50%) and
eliminated child support and did not specifically reserve the same. The support was not
specifically reserved and in equity should not be an offset given the fact each parent
exercises equal time. Child support after October 1, 2003, is as previously ordered in the
December 2003 trial on custody and support is washed between the parties, so that no
ongoing child support is paid after October 1, 2003." (R. at 1174-75, lj 2.)
11

Husband filed a motion to alter, amend or set aside the Final Decree on May 24,
2007, and raised the same issues respecting child support that remained pending before
the court pursuant to Husband's earlier-filed motion. The court issued its final
Memorandum Decision on June 6, 2007, denying Husband's requested relief. (R. at
1224-25, at 2, Resp. Add. Tab 3.) Thereafter, the court entered an Amended Final
Decree on July 6, 2007, incorporating in full the child support language set forth in the
Final Decree. (R. at 1228, f 2.)
Husband appealed to the court of appeals, arguing inter alia, that the trial court
erred in (1) awarding alimony to Wife after Husband's obligation to pay alimony had
terminated, and (2) failing to assess child support arrearages to Wife for the time period
prior to the December 17, 2003 stipulation during which he had sole physical custody of
the parties' children.
Wife cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's finding that Husband paid
virtually all of the family expenses prior to the Bifurcated Decree and arguing that the
trial court abused its discretion in not awarding her one-half the rental income received
by Husband during this time. Wife did not request a transcript of the testimony at trial,
and no transcript was made part of the record on appeal.
On June 26, 2008, the court of appeals issued its Memorandum Decision in
Ostermiller v. Ostermillen 2008 UT App 249, 190 P.3d 13. (Resp. Add. Tab 1.) The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of alimony to Wife for the time period
subsequent to the Bifurcated Decree and prior to her remarriage. The Court held:
"We . . . realize that there may be some circumstances where an alimony award may
12

apply retroactively to the time during which a request for alimony was pending.
However, this case does not present such a circumstance because Wife was remarried
over three years before any alimony was awarded. . . . Husband's obligation to pay
alimony to Wife terminated before it ever arose, i.e., before the trial court entered an
order awarding alimony. Thus, the award of alimony after Wife's remarriage was an
abuse of discretion." Id. at ^J 2.
Additionally, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of rental income
to Wife for the time period from January 2000 through March 2001, noting that the trial
court's ruling "was based on its finding that 'the income from those apartments was used
to provide for family expenses.'" Id. at ^f 6. Because Wife's appeal challenged this
finding, but did not marshal the evidence in support of it, the court concluded that it
"must assume that the finding is adequately supported by the evidence." Id.
The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's failure to assess child support
arrearages against Wife for the time period that the children were in Husband's sole
custody, on the ground that Husband had not provided a transcript of the December 17,
2003 proceeding "so that we may review the trial court's ruling and reasoning."
Therefore, the court held, "we assume that there were sufficient evidence and findings to
support the trial court's decision, and we refuse to disturb that decision." Ostermiller v.
Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, f4, 190 P.3d 13 (citation omitted).
This matter is now before this court on writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Wife's petition and Husband's cross-petition, as to the issues above
identified.
13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The court of appeals did not err in reversing the trial court's initial award of
alimony to Wife entered nearly four years after Wife had remarried, for a period of time
during which Wife made no effort to obtain an award of temporary alimony, nor
separately try the issue of permanent alimony. The purpose of alimony is to provide
separate maintenance and support for a spouse in need. It is not meant to provide a
windfall to a former spouse and her new husband several years after the former spouse
has remarried.
The court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's finding that, because
Husband paid virtually all the family expenses prior to entry of the Bifurcated Decree,
Wife was not entitled to one-half of the rental income received by Husband during this
time period. Wife did not properly challenge the finding, having failed to provide a
transcript of the trial testimony, and having failed in her obligation to marshal the
evidence supporting the finding. Moreover, the parties' property was divided in the
Bifurcated Decree, including any income not used for family expenses that may have
accumulated, and the same constituted a final resolution of all such property issues
between the parties.
The court of appeals erred in not addressing the trial court's failure to assess child
support arrearages owed by Wife for the time period from February 2000 to December
2003 that the children were in Husband's sole custody pursuant to court order. The error
was grounded in the court of appeals' mistaken conclusion that the issue had been
previously addressed by a court ruling on December 17, 2003 as to which Husband had
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provided no transcript. However, the record establishes that there was no hearing or trial
December 17, 2003, but only a stipulation on the record. The stipiilaiioii addressed
prospective child support only, not child support arrearages. Nor was the issue of child
support arrearages waived by Husband. Nor did the trial court make findings justifying a
deviation from the guidelines with respect to the arrearages. Rather, the trial court
specifically found that "there has been no evidence suggested to the Court to establish a
deviation from the uniform child support level." It was therefore an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to enter an order eliminating child support arrearages, which the Utah
Child Support Act mandates must be determined and assessed based upon the child
support guidelines.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN REVERSING THE
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY TO WIFE ENTERED
AFTER WIFE HAD REMARRIED AND HUSBAND'S
OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY HAD TERMINATED

The facts in this case pertaining to alimony are clear. Wife requested temporary
alimony in her initial court papers, was awarded $1,000 to secure an apartment, and did
not renew her request for temporary alimony thereafter during the entire pendency of
these drawn-out proceedings, though by statute she could have done so at any time prior
to termination of the claim by remarriage.
Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code specifies that the trial court in a divorce action
"may order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate
support and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other
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party." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (2008). Wife was aware of this statute, as she
requested temporary alimony in her initial papers. (R. at 10.) She also had no hesitation
to request various relief throughout pendency of the proceedings (R. at 44, R. at 91, R. at
188, R. at 242, R. at 274), including a motion requesting that the court amend its initial
temporary custody order and award temporary custody and child support to her, made
two and one-half years in. (R. at 138.) Yet Wife did not pursue an award of temporary
alimony at any time, though the ''pendency of the action" turned into a seven-year ordeal.
For whatever reason, including because her needs were adequately met through
her own resources - which included a sizeable property settlement in the parties'
Bifurcated Decree - or those of her future husband's, with whom she was involved
during the parties' marriage and throughout the period preceding her re-marriage, Wife
chose not to pursue an initial award of alimony prior to its termination. The court of
appeals did not err in concluding that she was not permitted to obtain an initial award of
alimony thereafter.
Wife attempts to avoid the foregoing facts by finger-pointing and misinformation.
It is not her fault, claims Wife, that an alimony order did not enter. She could not control
the court's docket, she was the victim of everyone else's delay, she requested a trial date,
etc. The argument must fail. It was unnecessary for Wife to await trial to obtain an
alimony order. She was permitted by statute to request temporary alimony at any time
prior to trial, simply upon motion. What Wife could not do, but did do at the trial court
level - an error properly corrected by the court of appeals - was obtain an alimony order
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after her entitlement to alimony had terminated by remarriage. Siee Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(9) (2008).
An award of alimony after the right to alimony has terminated is contrary to the
purpose and intent of alimony. "The purpose of alimony is to 'provide support for the
wife.'" See Medley v. Medley, 2004 Utah App 179, n.4., 93 P.3d 847 (quoting
Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981)). It is not for the purpose of
conferring upon the wife a windfall that cannot now provide for whatever need she may
have had for "separate maintenance and support" prior to her remarriage. Rather, an
alimony award such as the award entered here, in the accumulated sum of $32,220 plus
interest of $11,814.00 (R. at 1228), entered nearly four years after Wife had remarried,
simply allows Wife and her new husband to by a new car, take an expensive vacation,
remodel their home, and the like. This is not the purpose of alimony. Cf. State v.
Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997) (noting distinction between "child support" and
"reimbursement," stating: "Genuine child support must be available to meet the current
needs of the child, and payments made later cannot alter the level of support that the
children have already received. Understanding this, we decline to employ the euphemism
"back child support" for payments that were not available to meet past needs and are not
even legally required to be used for the children's present and future needs.").
Had Wife truly been in need of alimony prior to her remarriage, she could have
and would have pursued it. The court of appeals' observation and reasoning on this point
is correct: "If Wife was in need of assistance to maintain [the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage] during the duration of the divorce proceedings prior to her
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remarriage, she should have taken some action to obtain a temporary alimony award
during that time/' Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, If 3, 190 P.3d 13.
Husband acknowledges that there is no case or statute in this jurisdiction that
specifically states that a request for an initial award of alimony may not be brought after
the recipient's entitlement to alimony has terminated by operation of law. However,
Section 30-3-5(8)(h) of the Utah Code precludes modification of a previously ordered
alimony award after alimony has terminated. That section provides: ''Alimony may not
be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h)(2008). In Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
the court of appeals held that the wife's motion to modify her alimony award made prior
to termination of the alimony obligation was timely, and could therefore proceed. See id.
The clear implication of the holding is that, had the alimony obligation terminated, a
motion to modify it would not have been timely, and therefore could not proceed.
This reasoning applies a fortiori to the facts of this case. There was no initial
award of alimony in place that Wife sought to modify after Husband's alimony obligation
had terminated by Wife's remarriage; rather, in her ''Request for Trial" filed June 17,
2004 (R. 278), Wife sought an initial award of alimony after Husband's alimony
obligation had terminated. The request was untimely at that point. When the issue was
brought to the trial court's attention by Husband's Motion for Summary Dismissal of
Retroactive Alimony Claim (R. at 334), the matter should have been foreclosed.
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Wife argues, however, that there are several statutes that specify that certain
claims survive remarriage. This point is irrelevant. There is a statute tllat specifies that
alimony does not survive remarriage, "[u]nless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2008). What other statutes say about other
cause of action has no bearing on the issue at 1land, which is alimony.
Recognizing that Section 30-3-5(9) is fatal to her claim, Wife attempts to
refashion the Bifurcated Decree's reservation of "alimony, if any" into an order that
meets the exception within the statute, namely "a decree of divorce specifically
providing] otherwise." Thus, Wife claims that the reservation of "alimony, if any" is the
equivalent of a provision in the decree of divorce "that alimony was a triable issue
properly reserved for later trial despite remarriage of either party." Brief on Certiorari, at
22. However, the reservation of "alimony, if any" in the Bifurcated Decree, is not a
waiver of the right to challenge Wife's entitlement to alimony upon termination, does not
mean that alimony must be tried, or awarded, and does not address remarriage at all.
Next, Wife makes numerous points about various inapposite - and undisputed aspects of alimony law in general. It is agreed that the trial court has jurisdiction to make
temporary alimony awards, to modify previously entered alimony awards upon a showing
of substantial change in circumstance (though not for a period of time preceding the filing
of a petition to modify), to bifurcate divorce proceedings and try the issue of alimony
separately from other issues, to extend the duration of alimony beyond the length of the
marriage upon a finding of extenuating circumstances, etc. None of these general
propositions help Wife. The court did not award temporary alimony, tlloiigli it could
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have; no alimony order ever entered for the court to modify, and this is not a modification
proceeding; Wife did not seek to bifurcate the alimony portion of the case, though she
could have; and the duration of alimony was never at issue in this case as Wife
acknowledged al all times that alimony terminated upon her remarriage. Wife's listing of
all that could have been, but was not, preponderates rather in favor of the court of
appeals' holding than against it.
Nor do the cases that Wife cites help her. None of the cases, except Roberts v.
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), so much as touch upon the central fact in
this case, namely, the termination of Wife's claim pursuant to Section 30-3-5(9) of the
Utah Code. And Roberts, while touching on the fact, is readily distinguishable. The trial
court in Roberts entered an initial award of alimony prior to the termination of the wife's
alimony claim by remarriage, which the wife appealed. The court of appeals held that,
u

[a]lthough [the statutory precedent to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9)] extinguishes any

alimony claim Wife could make subsequent to September 12, 1991, it does not moot her
claim to alimony during the approximately nine-month interim period after the divorce
was decreed but before Wife remarried." Id. at 198.
Certainly, the same result would pertain in this case, had the trial court entered an
initial award of alimony prior to Wife's remarriage. But that is not what occurred.
Instead, the trial court entered an initial award of alimony three years after Wife's
remarriage, which Husband appealed. The court of appeals' holding is correct in
Roberts, and it is correct here, with each turning on the critical distinction in the facts.
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Wife also argues that the trial court had discretion in this case to impose a $32,220
alimony judgment against Husband, with an additional $11,814 in interest, because,
according to Wife, Husband was at fault. The court of appeals correctly rejected this
argument, noting: "'[T]he purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not
to inflict punitive damages on the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty against
the husband nor a reward to the wife . .. .'" Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App
249, n.4, 190

13 (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (I Jtah 1977))

As Wife persists before this court in arguing that the trial court's award of alimony
to Wife was proper as a punishment for Husband's perceived misbehavior, it should be
noted that the trial court did not agree with Wife, and did not engage in any "punitive"
alimony award. Rather, the trial court specifically found, "[T]here is sufficient evidence
to suggest that both parties are at fault in this matter, and the Court will not consider the
issue of fault relative to the award of alimony." (R. at 1089.) Nor did the trial court
place blame on Husband for any delays, but instead was "unable to congratulate either
party with respect to the protracted and tortured litigation in this case." (R. at 1091.)
It should further be noted lllal, while Wife has persisted in arguing that her failure
to obtain an alimony award until more than three years after her remarriage was
Husband's fault, the record evidence to support this claim is as lacking as it was when the
court of appeals stated: "[W]e are not convinced that delay in iin -*-K -I nn: o( .»: alimony
award was largely Husband's fault, especially considering Wife's passive approach to
obtaining an alimony award - failing to request that the issue be addressed until after she
was already remarried." Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 294, n. 4. Wife has brought nothing
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new to the table in this proceeding, but simply repeats her numerous, unsupported
misstatements.
Most fatal to Wife's finger-pointing delay argument, however, is that while no one
can doubt that it should not require seven years to obtain a final decree of divorce, yet
neither can it be doubted that the availability of temporary orders during the pendency of
this "protracted and tortured litigation" destroys the delay argument altogether.
Finally, Wife makes much of the fact that her alimony claim was reserved in the
Bifurcated Decree, and thereafter on December 17, 2003 when the parties entered into an
oral stipulation regarding custody, parent-time, and prospective child support. Wife
contends that reservation of the claim was tantamount to a determination on its merits and even a waiver on Husband's part of his right to challenge Wife's pursuit of alimony
after the obligation to pay alimony had terminated.
Reservation of an issue does not speak to its merits. Reservation of an issue
merely means that the claim remains pending before the trial court and may be addressed
at a later date. See Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., L.L.C., 2005 UT 59,1j 27, 123 P.3d 393.
It signals that the judgment is not final, and that matters remain outstanding that must be
resolved before the judgment is ripe for appeal. See id. Reservation of a claim does not
bear on the substance of how the claim that has been reserved must be resolved.
In this case, reservation of the alimony issue signaled that no stipulation had been
reached as to that issue, and the issue therefore remained pending before the trial court.
Husband's motion for summary dismissal of Wife's alimony claim, filed February 10,
2005, brought the substantive issue before the court for final resolution. The trial court
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erred in concluding that it was obliged to deny this motion because the issue of alimony
had been reserved for later resoliition. Later resol

u es resohr
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upon the merits of the claim when the merits are examined. That is what should have
occurred here at the trial court level, and did happen before the court of appeals.
In short, Wife has provided no grounds for this court to reverse *

Mirt of

appeals' holding that "Husband's obligation to pay alimony to Wife terminated before it
ever arose," and thus "the award of alimony after Wife's remarriage was an abuse of
discretion." Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, U 2, 190 P.ja u . The court
of appeals did not err, its reasoning is sound, and it should be upheld.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF AN AWARD TO WIFE OF ONEHALF THE RENTAL INCOME RECEIVED BY HUSBAND
PRIOR TO ENTRY OF THE BIFURCATED DECREE

In her cross-appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Wife challenged the trial court's
ruling that she should not be awarded alimony, or alternatively one-half of the rental
income received by Husband, after the parties' separated in February 2000 and prior to
entry of the Bifurcated Decree in March 2001. The court of appeals, having already
concluded that Wife was not entitled to alimony, including the period from February
2000 through March 2001, addressed Wife's alternative claim to an award of one-half the
rental income received by Husband separately.
It should first be noted that the statute cited by Wife for the first time in this appeal
on certiorari, namely Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-6, is inapplicable to this case. The statute
simply allows a husband or wife who owns property possessed or controlled by his or her
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spouse to maintain an action therefor, or for any right growing out of the same.
However, Wife did not own any property individually, but rather the properties of the
parties were jointly held during the marriage and managed by Husband, who continued to
manage the properties after the parties separated until entry of the Bifurcated Decree.
See Memorandum Decision, at 5 (R. at 1088) ("There was testimony that the Respondent
had received approximately $18,697.00 per year from the apartments and it appears that
most of the time, all of the apartment income was received by the Respondent.")
Additionally, Wife never brought an action pertaining to the property, or for any
right growing out of the same, separate from this divorce action. She was awarded one of
the properties in the Bifurcated Decree C'[the] Apple Tree Lane Apartments," R. at 84),
and Husband was awarded the other (wi[t]wo 4-plex buildings known as Carriage Court,"
R. at 85). * These provisions, together with the others provisions in the Bifurcated
Decree, resolved all property issues between the parties. No claim was made by Wife to
any "right growing out o f her ownership interest in the rental properties at the time these
properties were divided, and no such claim was reserved for later resolution. Rather, the
Bifurcated Decree incorporated the parties' complete and final property settlement.
Therefore, the trial court rightly analyzed Wife's alternative claim for one-half the total
rental income prior to entry of the Bifurcated Decree within the alimony rubric.

1

After entry of the Bifurcated Decree, the trial court attributed income of $970 per month
to Wife as the amount she would have received had she kept the Apple Tree Lane
Apartments. (R. at 1090.) Prior to entry of the Bifurcated Decree and Wife's receipt of
the Appletree Lane income, it is appropriate to use Wife's wage earnings alone (which
the court found to be $1,298 per month (R. at 1090)) for child support purposes.
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The trial court found that Husband's income prior to entry of the Bifurcated
Decree, including income from the rental properties, was used to pay family expenses,
and therefore neither alimony, nor half the rental income for this time period, should be
awarded.
The trial court's analysis comports with our appellate case law, i = » p,ir:

lar

Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in which the wife made a similar
argument to that made by Wife here, namely, that she should receive half the husband's
income during the fourteen months between the time they separated atid vvete divorced.
As with this case, the wife and husband in Johnson had bifurcated the divorce proceeding
and had divided their property by stipulation prior to trial. The trial court rejected the
claim, and the court of appeals affirmed, stating: "If that income was not used for family
support. . . then it was accumulated and divided pursuant to the property stipulation.
Moreover, [the wife] has not presented any evidence that this income was placed in some
hidden asset and not accounted for in the decree." Id. at 699.
Here, Wife's claim to one-half the rental income received by Husband during the
fourteen-month between the parties' separation and entry of Bifurcated Decree must fail
for the precise reason that the wife's claim in Johnson failed: the income was used for
family expenses, as the trial court found, and if it was not, it was accumulated and
divided between the parties in the stipulated property division incorporated inlo the

25

Bifurcated Decree. Wife presented no evidence that the rental income existed in a hidden
asset somewhere and was unaccounted for in the Bifurcated Decree.2
On appeal to the court of appeals, Wife ignored the foregoing fundamental flaw in
her contention that she should be awarded one-half the rental income received by
Husband prior to the Bifurcated Decree, and instead assailed the trial court's finding that
Husband's income was used for family expenses during this period. The trial court
reiterated the finding several times. First, in its first Memorandum Decision, the court
stated: "Petitioner's first year of income must take into consideration that virtually all of
the family expenses were paid by the Respondent, during January 2000 [thru] March
2001." (R. at 1088.) And thereafter, "the Court finds first that the initial period of
February 2000 to April 2001 no alimony is awarded due to the fact that Respondent
provided for virtually [all] the family's expenses and it is impossible to calculate the
parties' needs at that time." (R. at 1090.)
When Wife asked the trial court to reconsider, the trial court expounded and
clarified the finding in its second Memorandum Decision, stating: "[Wife's] first point is
that she should be awarded alimony for the period of January 2000 through April 2001 on
the basis that the apartment income of the parties was received and used entirely at the
discretion of [Husband]. The Court did not ignore that fact in issuing its decision but
found . . . that the income from those apartments was used to provide for family expenses
and that virtually all of the family expenses were assumed by [Husband]. The exact
2

To the contrary, the testimony at trial was that little or no money was distributed from
the Appletree Lane Apartment in 2000 - early 2001 because the profits were embezzled
by Wife's brother during this time period. (R. at 984.)
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figures were not supplied, but the lifestyle of the parties continued during that period of
time much in tl le fashion, it 1 lad before, in tl lat the month-

•

-..; expenses were paid

for and that they were, by testimony, paid for in part from the proceeds of those
apartments." (R. at 1133.)
Without marshaling the evidence in support of this finding, v
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court of appeals a trial transcript, and with precious little citation to record evidence at
all, Wife simply argued on appeal that these detailed and reiterated findings of the trial
court were wrong, and advanced her own calculations, according to her own, singular
perspective.
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that the party who
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to
the evidence "shall include in the record a transcript of the evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion." Utah R. App. i\ 11(e)(2). See also Horton v. Gem State Mutual,
794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where appellant argued trial court's finding was
clearly erroneous but did not provide transcript of proceedings below, the claim of error
was "'merely an unsupported, unilateral allegation which we cannot resolve."'). Id. at
849 (citations omitted). Wife failed to comply with the Rule 11(e), and therefore
necessarily failed in her challenge to the trial court's findings.
The court of appeals properly affirmed on this issue, for the basic and fiittdamental
reason that Wife had failed to comport with her obligation to provide the appellate court
with a complete record of the trial proceedings and marshal the evidence contained
therein that supports the challenged finding. Wife did • • provide a ti ial trai isci ipt, ai id
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made no attempt at marshaling. As the court of appeals concluded, the finding must
therefore be assumed to have been adequately supported by the evidence. Ostermiller v.
Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249, U 6, 190 P.3d 13.
Now, before this court, Wife again advances her own unsupported calculations of
what was and was not spent by Husband and what should and should not have been
awarded to Wife, again ignoring her obligation to cite the record and to provide a
complete record. Wife's calculations are nonsensical and contrary even to that one small
piece of the record evidence that Wife does cite, namely Defendant's Exhibit 18. Wife
claims: u[T]he Trial Court held that Husband paid family expenses of $14,724.00. . . .
Husband produced evidence of $14,724.00 in expenses he claimed he paid for Wife (see
Husband's Exhibit 18, Addendum Ex. 11)." Brief on Certiorari, at 34-35.
In fact the trial court did not hold that Husband paid family expenses of $14,724.
The trial court simply found that Husband paid virtually all the family expenses.
Moreover, Defendant's Exhibit 18 does not show that Husband paid family expenses of
$14,724.00, but rather shows that Husband paid $22,536.10 in certain statutory expenses
for the children (only half of which were attributed to Wife's benefit) and additional sums
that directly benefited Wife. (Defendant's Ex. 18.)
Wife then claims that, all appearances to the contrary, she did in fact marshal the
evidence in support of the trial court's finding because Defendant's Exhibit 18
"constituted all of the evidence Husband submitted on family expense [sic] he paid."
Brief on Certiorari, at 35. This claim is truly astounding. The evidence before the trial
court consisted of three days of trial testimony, relied upon by the trial court and
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referenced specifically in the trial court's finding. CTBIv testimony, [the monthly bills
and expenses were paid for] in part from the proceeds of those apartments." (R. at 1133,
emphasis added.)) Wife asks that this all be disregarded, or alternatively, that the court
simply take her word for it that nothing occurred during those three days that would have
had any bearing on the trial court's findings. The court of appeals was correct to decline
Wife's invitation, and to decline to substitute Wife's misinterpretation of a single exhibit
for a trial transcript and thorough citation to a complete record.
The court of appeals did not err in affirming the d ml courts ruling th.it Wife was
not entitled to half the rental income received by Husband prior to entry of the Bifurcated
Decree, grounded in part in its improperly challenged finding that Husband paid virtually
all the family expenses during this time period. This court should affirm the court of
appeals on this issue.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF CHILD SUPPORT TO HUSBAND FOR
THE TIME PERIOD PRIOR TO THE DECEMBER 17, 2003
STIPULATION DURING WHICH HUSBAND HAD SOLE
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN

The court of appeals did not address Husband's child support claim on appeal
because Husband "failed to provide us with the transcript from the [December 17, 2003]
proceeding so that we may review the trial court's ruling and reasoning." Ostermiller v.
Ostermiller, 2008 UT App 249,1| 4, 190 P.3d 13. The court of appeals erroneously
concluded that the December 17, 2003 proceeding was a trial or hearing. The record
demonstrates that this is not the case, but that instead, on December 17, 2003, the parties
recessed immediately after opening statements and ni*\t( a) in settlement negotiations off
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the record. The negotiations resulted in a stipulation, and only then did the parties return
to place the stipulation on the record. (R. at 193-94.) The trial court took no evidence
and issued no rulings. The stipulation was subsequently reduced to the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order entered April 27, 2005. (R. at 488.)
It is true, as the court of appeals notes, that the trial court in its third Memorandum
Decision following the three-day alimony and child support trial that took place August
31, 2005, September 20, 2005, and November 16, 2006, stated: "It should be
remembered that the decision issued relative to child support dates back to December 17,
2003. The internal inconsistency argued by the Respondent now, together with the
historical facts of this case, prevents this Court from modifying its earlier decisions."
(R. at 1225.)
This statement is strange for several reasons. First, there was no "decision issued
relative to child support" on December 17, 2003. There was only a stipulation that
prospective base child support would be zero, in light of the newly-adopted joint custody
schedule. (R. at 193-94.) Second, it is unclear what the trial court felt was "the internal
inconsistency" argued by Husband, nor what the historical facts of the case were, and the
trial court does not elucidate. Third, Husband's position was that the trial court should
not modify its earlier decisions respecting child support, and the trial court also declares
allegiance to these decisions, yet denies Husband's motion.
The trial court's earlier decisions respecting child support, and the only findings
made by the trial court pertaining to child support, are in its first Memorandum Decision.
There, the trial court found as follows: "At the initial hearing before the Court, custody
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was granted to [Husband] with parent-time being provided to [Wife]. [Wife's] parenttime consisted of 28% of the time for purposes of establishing child support, and that
provision remained intact until the 17th of December, 2003, when a modification occurred
providing for [Wife] to have an increase in parent-time to 40%. No child support
thereafter was to be paid by either party." (R. at 1084-85.) Further, the trial court found
that the reservation of child support in the Bifurcated Decree "also reserved the
examination of the child support, if any, to be paid by [Wife] to [Husband] from the
original award of custody until the final resolution of the same in December of 2003."
(R. at 1086.) Based on these findings, the trial court concluded: "[T]he issue with
respect to child support is met and there has been no evidence suggested to the Court to
establish a deviation from the uniform child support level, therefore, the incomes found
by the Court herein are to be used by the parties in establishing child support to be paid
from [Wife] to [Husband] during the period above-mentioned." (R. at 1090.)
The trial court never modified or amended these findings pertaining to child
support. Yet it signed an Amended Final Decree prepared by Wife in which child
support arrearages were "zero" and "washed between the parties" (R. at 1228) - a
conclusion entirely inconsistent with its own findings. The interim steps are as follows.
After the trial court issued its first Memorandum Decision, Wife raised numerous
objections in a motion to amend judgment or for reconsideration. (R. at 1093.) Amongst
these was Wife's objection to the trial court's finding that Wife had the children 28% of
the time. Referring to an exhibit that was not received into evidence at trial (but had
apparently been pre-marked for the bench trial that did not take place December 17,
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2003) (R. at 1111), Wife calculated that she had the children "a minimum of 40% of the
time from January, 2000 to December, 2003." (R. at 1095.)
Wife's referenced exhibit merely summarized the custody schedule contained in
the Bifurcated Decree. (R. at 1111.) It then set forth Wife's own, unsupported view as to
the import of that schedule, coming up with 40% by attributing overnights to Wife for
days in which Wife had the children only during the day. As the trial court correctly
found, however, Wife's parent-time schedule of two overnights per week equates to
28 percent of overnights for purposes of determining the appropriate child support
worksheet to calculate child support.
In response to Wife's motion, the trial court entered a second Memorandum
Decision addressing the numerous objections. As to child support, the trial court simply
stated: "[T]here was no responsive argument by the Respondent. . . . Therefore, that
relief is granted and child support should be awarded accordingly." (R. at 1134.)
Husband immediately brought the plain error to the court's attention, pointing out
that the trial court did not have discretion to calculate child support as urged by Wife, but
must comply with the child support guidelines as it had done in its earlier decision. (R. at
1139-43.) Yet in its third Memorandum Decision, quoted above and by the court of
appeals, the trial court inexplicably states that "[Husband] takes a curious position, and
one which is rather inconsistent with the history of this case" which "prevents this Court
from modifying its earlier decisions." (R. at 1225.)
It is unclear what the trial court felt was "curious" about Husband's position that
child support should be awarded in conformance with the trial court's own findings and
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the child support guidelines. What is clear is that thereafter Wife submitted to the court a
Final Decree that did not incorporate the award of child support that she had herself
requested per the joint child support worksheet that she had prepared (R. at 1113),
namely $179 per month (as contrasted with $404 per month on a sole custody worksheet
(R. at 1208)). Rather, the Final Decree made no award of child support whatsoever, in
complete contravention to the court's actual rulings in both its first and second
Memorandum Decisions.
Once again, Husband brought this plain error to the court's attention (R. at 120204), but to no avail. The trial court signed and entered the Amended Final Decree, which
awarded no child support of any kind - whether calculated on a joint custody worksheet
or a sole custody worksheet - for the period from February 2000 through December 2003
during which Husband had sole physical custody of the children.
The trial court was led into error by Wife in this case, and that error was
compounded by Wife's misrepresentations at the appellate level regarding the nature of
the December 17, 2003 proceeding. Wife repeatedly referred to the proceeding as a trial,
and has done so again before this court. Husband requests that the error be corrected.
Child support is an inalienable right belonging to the children who are owed the support.
The right cannot be simply dispensed with by the trial court or "washed between the
parties."
In Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, the court of appeals reiterated this court's
longstanding observations regarding the right of child support, stating:
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'The right to support from the parents belongs to the minor children and is
not subject to being bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way
defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parents.' . . . Parents have 'the
duty to support the children [they] ha[ve] brought into the world. This duty
is inalienable and [parents] cannot rid [themselves] of it by purporting to
transfer it to someone else, by contract or otherwise.5
Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ^ 14, 169 P.3d 754 (citing Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d
516, 517 (Utah 1981) and Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127, 128-29 (Utah 1977)); see also
Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, n.6, 176 P.3d 464.
The Utah Child Support Act also makes clear that child support is a right
belonging to children, which cannot be lost or waived by a parent by nonaction. Section
78B-12-105 provides: "Every child is presumed to be in need of the support of the
child's mother and father. Every mother and father shall support their children." Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-12-105 (2008). Section 78B-12-109 states that waiver and estoppel
may not be applied to defeat the right of child support unless "the custodial parent freely
and voluntarily waives support specifically and in writing." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12109 (2008). Finally, "[w]hen no prior court order exists," the trial court "shall determine
and assess all arrearages based upon the guidelines described [in the Utah Child Support
Act.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-202(4) (2008). The obligation to assess arrearages
when a child is owed support is not discretionary, with the trial court. It is mandatory.
Husband was awarded temporary custody of the children in February 2000, and he
remained the sole physical custodian of the children through December 17, 2003. The
trial court found this fact (R. at 1084-85), and it is clearly established in the record (R. at
193-94; R. at 86). The trial court was therefore required to determine and assess child
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support arrearages owed by Wife for this period of time based on the child support
guidelines. It did not have the discretion to do otherwise.
Nor did the trial court have discretion to use a joint custody worksheet to calculate
the child support arrearages, as urged by Wife in her motion for reconsideration. (R. at
1095.) The Utah Child Support Act uses a bright line rule to delineate whether a joint
custody or sole custody worksheet should be used in a particular case. As defined in the
Act: "'Joint physical custody' means the child stays with each parent overnight for more
than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition
to paying child support." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(13). Our appellate courts have
"consistently required the application of the statute's bright line rule to determine which
child custody worksheet to use in calculating the support amount." Boyce v. Goble, 2000
UT App 237, ^1 19, 8 P.3d 1042. Where parent-time is quantified in a court order, the
trial court "must follow the mandate of Utah's child support guidelines, and use the
[appropriate] child support worksheet or make findings of fact justifying its deviation."
Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). See also Boyce v. Goble. 2000
UT App 237, Tf 21, 8 P.3d 1042 (holding failure to enter findings justifying deviation
from guidelines' bright line rule as to appropriate worksheet once time children are in
each parent's custody is quantified is "beyond the discretion of the trial court.")
Here, Wife's parent-time with the children was quantified initially at the February
3, 2000 hearing ("Sunday mornings to Tuesdays at 6:00 pm", R. at 37), and subsequently
in the Bifurcated Decree (alternating Sundays at 3:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. until Tuesdays
at 6:00 p.m. and Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m." R. at 86). Thus, for purposes
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of child support calculation, it remained at two overnights per week, or 28% of the time,
from February 3, 2000 until December 17, 2003. The trial court was therefore required to
follow the mandate of the child support guidelines and use a sole custody worksheet to
calculate the child support arrearages owed by Wife for this time period.
The trial court did not do so, but instead, while finding that "the issue with respect
to child support is met and there has been no evidence suggested to the Court to establish
a deviation from the uniform child support level," assessed no child support arrearages at
all. This was an abuse of discretion, which the court of appeals should have addressed
and corrected.
It did not do so because it was lead into error by Wife, who repeatedly
mischaracterized the December 17, 2003 stipulation as a trial. Wife persists before this
court in the misstatements and misrepresentations by which she succeeded with the court
of appeals. She states: "All child support issues were actually ruled on at trial on
December 17, 2003 and became res judicata." Brief on Certiorari, at 38. Wife goes so
far as to say that the "final hearing" December 17, 2003 pertained specifically to "all past
due child support." Brief on Certiorari, at 40. Yet the record shows clearly that there
was no "trial" or "final hearing" on December 17, 2003, and the record is completely
devoid of any indication that child support arrearages were addressed at all by the parties
in their December 17, 2003 stipulation. To the contrary, the order in which the
stipulation is reduced to writing addresses prospective child support only, stating: "That
neither party will pay to the other child support under this parenting arrangement and that
each will pay 50% of all uninsured medical expenses." (R. 490, emphasis added.)
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Nor does the order arising from the December 17, 2003 stipulation - or any other
document - contain a waiver by Husband of the right to collect child support for the
benefit of the children for the period of time that he had sole physical custody of the
children. Absent such a waiver, given "specifically and in writing," Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-12-109(1), the trial court was required to "determine and assess all arrearages"
based on the child support guidelines.
Wife further argues that Husband was required to specifically reserve the child
support claim in order for it to be addressed at trial. She cites no authority for this
proposition, which is directly contrary to both section 78B-12-202(4) and 78B-12-109 of
the Utah Code. It is also contrary to the fact that child support was tried with Wife's
acquiescence and ruled upon by the trial court, which specifically found that "the term
'child support issues' in that provision of [the Bifurcated Decree] also reserves the
examination of the child support, if any, to be paid by the Petitioner to the Respondent
from the original award of custody until the final resolution of the same in December of
2003." (R. 1086.)
Finally, Wife argues that the December 17, 2003 stipulation constituted a "final
order" that was "res judicata" as to child support. This argument clearly fails. The
stipulation - as Wife also argues, quite inconsistently - reserved several issues for later
resolution. It was therefore not a final order that resolved all the issues in controversy
before the court. Moreover, its "res judicata" effect, if any, could only possible apply to
what it addressed, namely, prospective child support, not child support arrearages The
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trial court was certainly not wCbarred" by the doctrine of res judicata from assessing child
support arrearages, and to the contrary, was required to do so by statute.
This court should reverse the court of appeals' erroneous affirmance of the trial
court's elimination of Wife's child support obligation during the period that Husband had
sole custody of the parties' two children, and direct entry of an order determining
arrearages based on the trial court's findings in its Memorandum Decision of March 5,
2007, calculated in accordance with the child support guidelines and based on a joint
custody worksheet.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the court of appeals' reversal of
the trial court's award of alimony to Wife, affirm the court of appeals' affirmance of the
trial court's denial of Wife's claim to one-half of the rental income received by Husband,
reverse the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's failure to assess child support
arrearages, and direct the entry of an order of child support arrearages from February
2000 to December 2003 based on the trial court's findings and consistent with the child
support guidelines.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

L>

day of April, 2009.

KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC
136 East South Temple, 21 st Floor
P.O. Box 45561
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561

PAIGE BIGELOW'
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
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trial court was certainly not "barred" by the doctrine of res judicata from assessing child
support arrearages, and to the contrary, was required to do so by statute.
This court should reverse the court of appeals' erroneous affirmance of the trial
court's elimination of Wife's child support obligation during the period that Husband had
sole custody of the parties' two children, and direct entry of an order determining
arrearages based on the trial court's findings in its Memorandum Decision of March 5,
2007, calculated in accordance with the child support guidelines and based on a sole
custody worksheet.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the court of appeals' reversal of
the trial court's award of alimony to Wife, affirm the court of appeals' affirmance of the
trial court's denial of Wife's claim to one-half of the rental income received by Husband,
reverse the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's failure to assess child support
arrearages, and direct the entry of an order of child support arrearages from February
2000 to December 2003 based on the trial court's findings and consistent with the child
support guidelines.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 2009.

KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC
136 East South Temple, 21 st Floor
P.O. Box 45561
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561

PAIGE BIGELOW
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
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Judges: James Z. Davis, Judge. WE CONCUR: William A. Thome Jr., Associate Presiding Judge,
Gregory K. Orme, Judge.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The First District Court, Logan Department (Utah) entered a decree of
dissolution, ending a seven-year bifurcated divorce proceeding between respondent former husband and
petitioner former wife. The husband appealed awards of alimony, evaluator costs, and other rulings. The
wife cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees and other rulings.A former wife was not entitled to
retroactive alimony because she remarried before a trial court awarded the alimony in a bifurcated
proceeding that lasted seven years; the former husband's obligation to pay alimony terminated pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) upon her remarriage.
OVERVIEW: The parties' bifurcated divorce proceedings lasted seven years. On appeal, the husband first
contended that the trial court erred in awarding retroactive alimony to the wife for the period of time during
the pendency of the proceedings before the wife remarried. In the bifurcated trial, the alimony issue had
been reserved to be addressed at a later time. The court held that the husband's obligation to pay alimony
terminated before it ever arose because the husband's alimony obligation automatically terminated when
the wife remarried under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2007) and because the wife had not requested
temporary alimony prior to her remarriage. A sum awarded to the wife for custodial evaluator costs was
improper without evidence that the wife had paid the amount and was due reimbursement. The court
remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of whether the alimony award equalized the parties' income
and negated the need for an award of attorney fees to the wife. If the wife had sufficient resources to meet
her needs, the husband might not be required to pay the wife's attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-3(1) (2007).
OUTCOME: The court reversed the award of alimony to the wife, the award of evaluator costs to the wife,
and the trial court's denial of attorney fees to the wife. The court remanded for reconsideration of an award
of costs and attorney fees. The court otherwise affirmed in all other respects.
LexisNexis Headnotes
Civil Procedure > Judiciai Officers > Judges > Discretion
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Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > Procedures
A trial court generally has considerable discretion in making an alimony award.
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Presumptions
Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > Modification &
Termination > Remarriage
Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > Procedures
It is presumed that a party's obligation to pay alimony automatically terminates when the other party
remarries, under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) (2007).
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Fact & Law Issues
The burden to marshal is not triggered simply because a trial court is afforded a level of discretion or
because a challenged issue is fact sensitive. Instead, the burden to marshal arises when a determination
of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive. But in cases
where a party raises a legal issue-not dependent on factual findings but instead challenging whether the
trial court properly applied the law to the facts as found below-there is no need to marshal.
Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > Obligations > General
Overview
The purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge.
Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Spousal Support > Obligations > General
Overview
The purpose of alimony is to provide support for a wife and not to inflict punitive damages on a husband.
Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the husband nor a reward to the wife.
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Records on Appeal
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > General Overview
If an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, an appellate court must assume the
regularity of the proceedings below.
Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Costs & Attorney Fees
So long as a former wife has sufficient resources to meet her needs, a former husband need not pay the
wife's attorney fees, even if he has more money at his disposal with which to pay his own fees and will
have more money to spare than will the wife. Simply put, if the wife has no need for assistance, attorney
fees may not be awarded under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (2007).
Opinion
Opinion by:

James Z. Davis
Opinion

{190 P.3d 14} MEMORANDUM DECISION
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DAVIS, Judge
P1 David G Ostermiller (Husband) appeals the district court's Amended Final Decree, which ended
the bifurcated divorce proceedings between him and Shirlene Ostermiller (Wife) Wife cross-appeals
other aspects of that same order We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
P2 Husband first contends that the trial court erred in awarding retroactive alimony to Wife We
agree We recognize that a trial court generally has considerable discretion in making an alimony
award 1 See {190 P.3d 15} Paffel v Paffel, 732 P 2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986) We also realize that there
may be some circumstances where an alimony award may apply retroactively to the time during which
a request for alimony was pending However, this case does not present such a circumstance
because Wife was remarried over three years before any alimony was awarded The trial court, as it
acknowledged, never awarded alimony before Wife remarried Instead, during the seven years of the
bifurcated divorce proceedings, the alimony issue was simply reserved to be addressed at a later
time The issue was never addressed prior to the March 2007 Memorandum Decision, which awarded
Wife alimony for a period of time during the pendency of the proceedings before she remained
However, because it is presumed that a party's obligation to pay alimony "automatically terminates"
when the other party remarries, see Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(9) (2007), Husband's obligation to pay
alimony to Wife terminated before it ever arose, i e , before the trial court entered an order awarding
alimony 2 Thus, the award of alimony after Wife's remarriage was an abuse of discretion, and we
reverse this award 3
P3 Moreover, this result is consistent with the purpose of alimony, which is "to enable the receiving
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge" Paffel, 732 P 2d at 100 If Wife was in need of
assistance to maintain such a standard of living during the duration of the divorce proceedings prior to
her remarriage, she should have taken some action to obtain a temporary alimony award during that
time Instead, although Wife initiated the divorce proceedings in January 2000 and alleges lhat she
was in great need of assistance from that point forward, she did not request a trial on the alimony
issue until over four years later—in June 2004, which was eight months after her remarriage and after
Husband's obligation to pay alimony had expired 4
P4 Husband also argues that the trial court erred by failing to award him child support for the nearly
four years between the time when he was awarded custody and the time when the parties signed the
stipulation providing that neither party would pay {190 P.3d 16} child support The trial court, in a
Memorandum Decision, said of its determination to not award child support that "[i]t should be
remembered that the decision issued relative to child support dates back to December 17, 2003 " And
in the Amended Final Decree, the court again reiterated that its decision to not award child support
was based on "the same analysis as discussed in the trial on December 17, 2003 " 5 Husband has,
however, failed to provide us with the transcript from the referenced proceeding so that we may review
the trial court's ruling and reasoning We therefore must assume the regularity of the proceedings
below See State v Miller, 718 P 2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) ("If an appellant fails to provide an
adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below") Thus,
we assume that there were sufficient evidence and findings to support the trial court's decision, and
we refuse to disturb that decision
P5 Husband next argues that the trial court erred in awarding Wife $ 4000, plus interest, for
custodial evaluator costs The trial court was correct that Husband was responsible for the custody
evaluator costs under the initial Decree of Divorce But a second judgment for that same amount was
improper without evidence that Husband had not paid the amount as originally ordered, i e , that Wife
had paid for evaluator costs for which she was still waiting for reimbursement Husband argues that
no such evidence was ever presented, and in her response Wife points to no such evidence in the
record We therefore reverse this award to Wife in the Amended Final Decree 6
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P6 Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award her half of the profits on
rents over a fourteen-month period from apartments that were marital property. The court's reasoning
for this was based on its finding that "the income from those apartments was used to provide for
family expenses." Wife challenges this finding, arguing that there is no way this whole amount was
used for family expenses. But because Wife fails to marshal the evidence in support of this finding, we
must assume that the finding is adequately supported by the evidence. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT
82, P 80, 100 P.3d 1177. We therefore affirm on this issue.
P7 Wife also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her costs and
attorney fees. 7 Because the trial court's decision was based on the fact that the alimony award
equalized the parties' incomes and negated the need for an award of attorney fees to Wife, our
decision on appeal has altered the underpinnings of the denial and we must remand to the trial court
for reconsideration of this issue. But we take this opportunity to clarify the needs assessment required
by Utah Code section 30-3-3(1). See generally Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (2007). Wife reargues on
appeal her logic from below that Husband "still had much more available income to meet his {190
P.3d 17} needs than she did." But so long as Wife has sufficient resources to meet her needs,
Husband need not pay Wife's attorney fees, even if he has more money at his disposal with which to
pay his own fees and will have more money to spare than will Wife. Simply put, if Wife has no need for
assistance, attorney fees may not be awarded under section 30-3-3(1). See id.
P8 In sum, we reverse the award of alimony to Wife and the award of evaluator costs; we reverse
the trial court's denial ofattorney fees to Wife and remand for reconsideration of the issue; and we
affirm in all other respects.
James Z. Davis, Judge
P9 WE CONCUR:
William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Footnotes

1
Contrary to Wife's assertion, Husband need not marshal the evidence under the circumstances of this
case. The burden to marshal is not triggered simply because a trial court is afforded a level of
discretion or because a challenged issue is "fact sensitive." Instead, the burden to marshal arises
when "a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely
fact-sensitive."' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, P 20, 100 P.3d 1177 (emphasis added). But in cases
where a party raises a legal issue-not dependent on factual findings but instead challenging whether
the trial court properly applied the law to the facts as found below-there is no need to marshal. Such
is the situation with the alimony issue here.
2
The parties do not dispute this termination as a result of the remarriage.
3
Because we reverse the award of alimony, we need not reach Husband's arguments that the trial
court inappropriately determined the amount of alimony and that prejudgment interest should not be
allowed on the alimony award; nor do we need to address Wife's argument that alimony should have
been awarded for a longer time period. We do, however, note that the law is well settled as to the
© 2009 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to
the restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

process by which the trial court is to determine an alimony award, see Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App
506, PP 5-6, 153 P.3d 827 (refusing to support alimony awarded to the wife '"as an income
equalization concept,'" and instructing that "if [the wife] is not able to meet her own needs, [which are
assessed in light of the standard of living that the parties enjoyed during the marriage,] the trial court
should have determined the ability of [the husband] to fill the gap between [the wife's] needs and her
own ability to meet those needs, with an eye towards equalizing the parties' standards of living only if
there is not enough combined ability to maintain both parties at the standard of living they enjoyed
during the marriage"), and as to when prejudgment interest is allowed, see Orlob v. Wasatch Med.
Mgmt, 2005 UT App 430, P 35, 124 P.3d 269 ("Prejudgment interest is properly awarded when the
damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed
as of a particular time. [A] court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable within
a mathematical certainty." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
Wife argues that the trial court found "that [Husband] tried to hide, conceal or deceive the [c]ourt
regarding his actual income, and therefore, it was entirely appropriate for [the court] in equity and
fairness to award alimony retroactively." However, "[t]he purpose of alimony is to provide support for
the wife and not to inflict punitive damages on the husband. Alimony is not intended as a penalty
against the husband nor a reward to the wife . . .." English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, we are not convinced that delay in the entering of an
alimony award was largely Husband's fault, especially considering Wife's passive approach to
obtaining an alimony award-failing to request that the issue be addressed until after she was already
remarried.
5
The trial court stated that its decision was also based on the analysis from the April 27, 2005 findings.
Although we have considered these findings, they shed little light on the matter, and we must turn to
the other analysis referenced by the trial court for support of its decision.
6
The judgment in the original Decree of Divorce is, of course, still in force.
7
Wife states that this issue is controlled by Utah Code sections 30-3-5 and 30-3-3(2). These sections,
however, are inapplicable to this case. Although Wife points to no specific provision in section 30-3-5,
the only two references to attorney fees in that section apply to situations where "a petition for
modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied," see Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6) (2007), or where "a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by
a parent," see id. § 30-3-5(7). The situation here fits neither of those procedural scenarios. As to
section 30-3-3(2), which allows an award of attorney fees to a party that "substantially prevailed," this
provision is also inapplicable here because this is not an action "to enforce" a domestic order. See id.
§ 30-3-3(2). Instead, the action here is "to establish" a domestic order, and attorney fees in such a
situation are controlled by section 30-3-3(1), which allows an award, at the trial court's discretion,
based on the need of a party. See id. § 30-3-3(1) (allowing an award of attorney fees against a party in
order "to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action"). Although Wife never cites to this
subsection in her brief, she alludes to this provision by arguing her inability to pay her attorney fees.
We therefore proceed to address this issue under section 30-3-3(1).
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In the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of Utah

SHIRLENE OSTERMILLER,
Plaintiff(s),

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case Number: 004100017 DA

DAVID G. OSTERMILLER,

JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW
Defendant(s).

On the 5lh of March 2007, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision addressing the
issues raised at trial. Thereafter, on the 21st day of March, the Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend
Judgment or Motion for Reconsideration. The essence of the motion is that the Court failed to
consider certain aspects of the evidence.
Specifically, her first point is that she should be awarded alimony for the period of
January 2000 through April 2001 on the basis that the apartment income of the parties was
received and used entirely at the discretion of the Respondent. The Court did not ignore that fact
in issuing its decision but found, as stated in the Respondent's sur-reply, that the income from
those apartments was used to provide for family expenses and that virtually all of the family
expenses were assumed by the Respondent. The exact figures were not supplied, but the lifestyle
of the parties continued during that period of time much in the fashion it had before, in that the
monthly bills and expenses were paid for and that they were, by testimony, paid for in part from
the proceeds of those apartments.
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The second request is that for attorney's fees. Pursuant to UCA § 30-3-3, the Court
considered the issue of attorney's fees in this matter and concluded that none would be awarded
and that ruling remains. UCA § 30-3-3 does not require the Court to award fees either under
subsections (1) or (2), as it may consider the fees as appropriate. In this case, the Court did so
and found under the circumstances, due to the nature of the litigation, and how it was finally
resolved, neither party substantially prevailed and that despite arguments to the contrary, no fees
will be awarded.
Next is the argument relative to costs, which is more problematic. With respect to the
custody evaluation, the order had already been made in paragraph 5 of the Bifurcated Decree and
was not addressed specifically in the Memorandum Decision. Therefore, paragraph 5 of the
Bifurcated Decree remains, and costs as awarded therein are to be paid for by the parties with
respect to the custody evaluation. With respect to the hiring of Ken Canfield to assist the Court
in the determination of the Respondent's income, though it would appear that in some regard his
services were necessary and aided the Court in the matter, nevertheless no costs will be awarded
therein.
With regard to child support clarification, there was no responsive argument by the
Respondent to that provision under paragraph 4 of the Petitioner's memorandum. Therefore, that
relief is granted and child support should be awarded accordingly.
The procedural arguments made by the Respondent to Petitioner's memorandum are in
apropos as this matter is not before the Court for an amendment of judgment, as judgment has
not been finalized, but rather it is for reconsideration relative to items which were or were not
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addressed in the Memorandum Decision or have not yet been reduced to final judgment. With
respect to the sur-reply filed by the Respondent, once again, the issue of costs and child support
were not addressed.
Counsel for the Petitioner should formalize this ruling in the final decree.
Dated this

day of April, 2007.
BY THE COURT
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^ , r,ftn, T JoTdon J. Low, District Court Judge
% \ ? $ p v ^ p . : 'J First District Court

2007-04-27/GJL/ts

Memorandum Decision
Caseti 004J 00017
Ostermiller v Ostermiller
Page 3 of 3

-3-

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 004100017 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

NAME
PAIGE BIGELOW
Attorney RES
13 6 E S TEMPLE 21ST FLR
P 0 BOX 45561
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84145-0561
MARLIN J GRANT
Attorney PET
13 0 SOUTH MAIN
P 0 BOX 525
LOGAN UT 84323-0525

£7 day of

Page 1 (last)

Tab 3

In the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of Utah
SHIRLENE OSTERMILLER,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case Number: 004100017 DA

DAVID G. OSTERMILLER,

JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW
Respondent.

THE ABOVE MATTER is once again before the Court upon belatedly considered issues
which more properly should have been brought before the Court at a much earlier date.
Perspectively, on the 5th of March, 2007, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision.
Thereafter, a Motion to Amend Judgment or Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
Petitioner, Shirlene Shaw. To that motion, a Memorandum Decision was issued on the 27th of
April, 2007. On the 5th of May, the Respondent filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Memorandum
Decision in RE: Child Support. Both parties have filed their memoranda and responses thereto,
and then on the 25th of May, the Respondent filed another motion styled Motion to Alter, Amend
or Set Aside Final Decree. A Request to Submit relative to the Respondent's Motion to Alter or
Amend Memorandum Decision in RE: Child Support was filed on the 22nd of May by the
Respondent and on the same day, a Request to Submit was filed by the Petitioner relative to the
issue as to Respondent's motion to alter or amend the Court's decision. The Petitioner's
pleading is styled as a "Reply to Strike or Dismiss Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Final
Order." Primarily before the Court now in the different pleadings are issues relative to prejudgment interest, post-judgment interest, custody evaluation costs, and the issue relative to
custody and visitation with respect to a percentage there as it applies to child support.
To the Respondent's arguments with respect to pre-judgment interest, the Court
-1-
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disagrees. Pre-judgment interest v/ill be awarded at the appropriate rate. With respect to postjudgment interest, as to Respondent's argument, the Court agrees that post-judgment interest is to
be calculated at the judgment rate beginning at the time of the entry of judgment. As to custody
evaluation fees, that matter was addressed in the Memorandum Decision of April 27, 2007,
referencing the Decree dated March 21, 2001.
Relative to the argument on child support, the Respondent takes a curious position, and
one which is rather inconsistent with the history of this case. It should be remembered that the
decision issued relative to child support dates back to December 17, 2003. The internal
inconsistency argued by the Respondent now, together with the historical facts of this case,
prevents this Court from modifying its earlier decisions. That portion of the Respondent's
motion is denied.
With respect to the Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside Final Decree filed on the 24th of
May, 2007, to the extent this Memorandum Decision addresses that, the final decree is to be
modified. The Petitioner is not required to respond to that motion and this matter will be closed
when the final decree is amended to reflect the provisions of this decision.
Any further relief to be sought by the parties is not to be sought at the District Court level,
but through appeal.
Dated this

W

day of June, 2007.
BY THE COURT

ordon J. Low, District Court Judge
First District Court
2007-06-06/GJL/ts

Osteimillei v Osteumllei
#004 J00017 DA
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLENE OSTERMILLER,
Petitioner,

MINUTES
OSC/COUNTER OSC

vs.

Case No: 004100017 DA

DAVID G. OSTERMILLER,
Respondent

Clerk:

Commissioner:
DANIEL W. GARNER
Date:
February 3, 2 00 0

angeladb

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: SUZANNE MARYCHILD
Petitioner(s): SHIRLENE OSTERMILLER
Attorney for the Respondent: BRIAN CANNELL
Respondent(s): DAVID G. OSTERMILLER
Audio
Tape Number:
00-27 & 28
Tape Count: 6353 & 5797

HEARING
TIME: 12:05 PM On record.
Both parties are present with counsel.
The parties are still residing in the same residence.
TIME: 12:08 PM The attorneys review the letters that were sent
to the court by the petitioner's brother and sister.
TIME: 12:10 PM Ms. Marychild makes a motion for continuance.
TIME: 12:11 PM Mr. Cannell objects to continuing this hearing.
TIME: 12:16 PM The petitioner sworn and testified.
TIME: 12:31 PM Cross examination.
TIME: 12:42 PM The respondent sworn and testified.
TIME: 12:49 PM Cross examination.
TIME: 12:54 PM Mr. Cannell addresses the affidavit submitted by
the petitioner's parents.
TIME: 12:57 PM The respondent can pay the petitioner $1000.00 so
she can secure an apartment.
TIME: 12:58 PM The court orders that the parties will have joint
Page 1

Case No: 004100017
Date:
Feb 03, 2000
legal custody with the primary residence with the respondent.
TIME: 12:59 PM The court orders the respondent to pay $1000.00
to the petitioner.
The attorneys will work out a visitation schedule that is more
than the standard visitation.
TIME: 1:01 PM The attorneys will make a recommendation to the
court regarding child support.
Off record-recess.
On record.
The petitioner will have visitation for Sunday mornings to
Tuesdays at 6:00 p.m.
The petitioner will be the first choice to provide daycare.
The respondent will pay the $1000.00 today.
Ms. Marychild will prepare the order.
Off record.
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